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A Tribute to Justice Scalia: Why Bad
Cases Make Bad Methodology
Brian T. Fitzpatrick*
The Vanderbilt Law Review asked me to write a short
memorial tribute to my old boss, Justice Antonin Scalia, and I am
fortunate that Dean Chemerinsky's new book provides an apt occasion
to do so. To be as blunt as the Justice would have been: he would have
hated this book. Not because Dean Chemerinsky is not a gifted writer;
he most surely is. But because the entire methodology of the book-a
methodology I call "bad-cases" reasoning-was anathema to the
Justice. The Justice may not have been right about everything, but he
was right about this: bad-cases reasoning is bad methodology. In this
Essay, I try to explain why.
When Justice Scalia was asked how it could be that one or
another of someone's favorite constitutional rights was not recognized
by his originalist approach, he would often say something like the
following:
The Constitution does not guarantee everything that is good and it does not prohibit
everything that is bad. It only guarantees or prohibits the specific things it enumerates.
If you do not like the list, call your member of Congress.'

Yet, Dean Chemerinsky's new book is little more than an indictment
of the Supreme Court for not frequently enough recognizing Dean
Chemerinsky's favorite constitutional rights. The book proceeds along
the following syllogism: bad things have happened; the Supreme Court
did not stop them (or even brought them about); therefore, the
Supreme Court is a failure. 2 His list of bad things has some old

*

Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. J.D., 2000, Harvard Law School.

1.
See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 861
(1989) (noting that the Constitution "did not pretend to create a perfect society even for its own
age (as its toleration of slavery, which a majority of the founding generation recognized as an
evil, well enough demonstrates)" let alone "a document intended to create a perfect society for all
ages to come").
2.
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT 5 (2014) ('Throughout
this book, I tell stories of in which the Supreme Court sanctioned terrible injustices.'); Id. at 118
(' My goal throughout this book is to determine whether the Supreme Court made American
society better or worse.").
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favorites on it, as well as some of more recent vintage: Plessy v.

Ferguson,3 Dred Scott v. Sandford,4 Korematsu v. United States, 5 Buck
v. Bell, 6 Citizens United v. FEC,7 Shelby County v. Holder," etc. You
get the idea.
Dean Chemerinsky is not alone in this methodology. Indeed, it
is a common technique on the left to criticize originalism because it
leads to bad results. 9 A popular example uses Plessy: Plessy is a bad
result; originalism leads to Plessy; therefore, originalism must be
wrong. 10

This is what I mean by "bad-cases" reasoning. It posits that
any interpretation of the Constitution that leads to one or more of the
entries on someone's list of "bad" cases cannot be legitimate;
legitimate interpretation must line up with "good" results.11
The problem with bad-cases reasoning is that it is hopelessly
circular. How can we know whether a case was rightly or wrongly
decided unless we have a theory of the Constitution against which to
judge the case to begin with? In other words, to say that a case was
wrongly decided is to assume we already know the right way to
interpret the Constitution. Yet, proponents of bad-cases reasoning
offer it to us as a way to separate right interpretations from wrong
ones. 12 It cannot serve that function if it requires that we know the
right interpretations to begin with.
Dean Chemerinsky tries to avoid the circularity problem by
contending that "everyone" agrees that the cases on his list were
wrongly decided. 13 But this is obviously not true with respect to many
of the recent cases on his list like Citizens United and Shelby County.
Indeed, if "everyone" agreed with Dean Chemerinsky, we would not
3.
Id. at 38.
4.
Id. at 27.
5.
Id. at 59.
6.
Id. at 17.
7.
Id. at 249.
8.
Id. at 260.
9.
See, e.g., William P. Marshall, Progressive Constitutionalism, Originalism, and the
Significance of Landmark Decisions in Evaluating Constitutional Theory, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1251
(2011).
10. See id. at 1261-64 (discussing Brown v. Board of Education).
11. See generally id.
12. See id.
13. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 6:
I realize, of course, that there needs to be a rubric for assessing whether the Court is
succeeding or failing. One measure is the decisions... that are uniformly condemned
by subsequent generations of scholars and judges ....
[T]o make the case against the
Supreme Court, I will focus especially on examples . . . where virtually everyone
today-liberal and conservative alike-can agree the Court was wrong.
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need to worry about the Constitution at all; even with all the
imperfections in the democratic process, if "everyone" wants
something, the legislature usually delivers it. But even with respect to
the older, more notorious cases on his list-Plessy, Dred Scott,
Korematsu, Buck-the only thing everyone agrees with is that the
laws upheld in the notorious cases are morally reprehensible. 14
Everyone does not agree that these cases were wrongly decided as a
matter of law. 18 Thus, Dean Chemerinsky can avoid the circularity
problem only if we should equate what is unconstitutional with what
everyone agrees is morally reprehensible. 16 But the Constitution does
not say that. So why would we do it?
Dean Chemerinsky's answer is that we have no choice but to do
it on account of legal realism. Legal materials are ambiguous, he says;
judges' decisions must therefore be based on their moral views and not
on legal materials. 17 Thus, he says, the Supreme Court "could have"
interpreted the Constitution to side with him in all of the cases on his
list.18 But even if it is no doubt true that legal materials are often
ambiguous-1 9 -and Justice Scalia, too, was at least something of a
legal realist 2 0 -it does not follow that a judge can reach any result he
or she wants in every case. Most of us believe that legal materials are
at least somewhat constraining, that it is not politics all the way
14. In fact, everyone agrees only that these laws would be morally reprehensible today; the
Dean Chemerinskys who lived back then often supported these laws. See Corinna Barrett Lain,
Rethinking the Supreme Court's 'Tailures", 69 VAND. L. REV. 1019 (2016). How were these
Supreme Courts supposed to know that their Dean Chemerinskys would change their minds?
15. See, e.g., Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379 (2011).
16. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 22 (asserting that his students believe the Court ought
to change its interpretation of the Constitution whenever required by "basic human decency" and
"the most elemental notions of humanity).
17. Id. at 10:
There is thus a sense that it is the "law," not the justices, that is responsible for the
Court's decisions. This is nonsense and always has been. The Court is made up of
men, and now finally women, who inevitably base their decisions on their own values,
views, prejudices;
see also id. at 337-42; 340 ("[T]he decisions throughout this book reflect value choices made by
the justices. They should be blamed or praised for their choices.'); id. at 342 ("Let's admit that
this emperor has no clothes. The justices ... made a value choice to favor slave owners, and the
government when it interned the Japanese Americans, and businesses when they have struck
down so much regulatory legislation.').
18. Id. at 17, 27, 38, 59, 156, 336-37.
19. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Politics of Merit Selection, 74 MO. L. REV. 675, 688-89
(2009).
20. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 10
(1997) (acknowledging legal realism); Scalia, supra note 1, at 864 ('The inevitable tendency of
judges to think that the law is what they would like it to be will, I have no doubt, cause most
errors in judicial historiography to be made in the direction of projecting upon the age of 1789
current, modern values....").
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down. 21 Perhaps Dean Chemerinsky actually believes it is politics all
the way down. 22 But not many people subscribe to such extreme legal
realism; for the rest of us, to assess fairly whether a judge "could
have" decided a case one way or another, we must start, again, with a
theory of the Constitution.
The closest Dean Chemerinsky comes to invoking a theory of
the Constitution is his complaint that the Supreme Court failed to
protect "minorities" 23 in the cases on his list.24 This makes his list
appear to have at least some grounding in the Constitution because
one of the rationales for judicial review is indeed to look out for
minorities when the political branches will not. 25 But I am afraid this
is not enough grounding in the Constitution. Is it Dean Chemerinsky's
view that every time a member of a minority group files a
constitutional lawsuit, he or she should win it? If not every time, then
which times? What if members of other minority groups disagree with
the interpretation of the Constitution propounded by the group who
filed the lawsuit? Which minority group should prevail? We cannot
answer any of these questions without, again, a theory of the
Constitution.
Justice Scalia's methods were not perfect; he was the first to
concede that they had weaknesses. 26 Circularity, however, was not one
of them. I am afraid the same cannot be said for bad-cases reasoning.

21.
See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS: PRINCIPLE AND POLITICS
IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 35-63 (2008).

22. It is not clear to me whether or not he believes this. On the one hand, he says: "I am
most definitely not arguing that it is just a matter of justices deciding based on a whim or their
personal preferences." CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 340. On the other hand, in the very next
paragraph, he seems to argue precisely that:
he fact that many sources are considered helps to explain why the Supreme Court
has enormous discretion in deciding cases.... The justices cannot hide their decisions
behind the text of the Constitution; the decisions described throughout this book
reflect value choices made by the justices. They should be blamed or praised for their
choices. Id.
23. Id. at 10 (listing his "criteria" to "evaluate the Court" as "How has it done in protecting
the rights of minorities of all types? How has it done in upholding the Constitution in the face of
the repressive desires of political majorities?"). Oddly, in at least one of the cases on his hit listCitizens United-the Supreme Court protected a minority (and the one of the most concern to
those who created the Court to begin with): the rich.
24.
See id.
25. Id. at 10 ("[I] believe that the two preeminent purposes of the Court are to protect the
rights of minorities who cannot rely on the political process and to uphold the Constitution in the
face of any repressive desires of political majorities.'); see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST (1980); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Constitutionality of Federal Jurisdiction-Stripping
Legislation and the History of State Judicial Selection and Tenure, 98 VA. L. REV. 839, 846-47
(2012).
26. See generally Scalia, supra note 1.
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